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THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: SUGGESTED
REFORMS IN THE OVERSEAS REFUGEE

PROGRAM TO SAFEGUARD
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS FROM
COMPETING INTERESTS
Abstract"The Refugee Act of 1980 established an overseas refugee admissions program
based on systematic consultations between Congress and the executive branch. The author
suggests that refugee policy is subject to four competing influences: humanitarian concerns, foreign policy, special interest groups, and domestic concerns. Of these influences,
the author argues that humanitarian concerns should be the primary basis for United
States refugee policy. However, humanitarian concerns are currently overwhelmed by the
other three influences. This Comment critiques the lack of safeguards in the Act for
humanitarian concerns and proposes specific reforms.

Sometimes, we must interfere When human lives are endangered,
when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities
become irrelevant Wherever men or women are persecuted because of
theirrace, religion, orpoliticalviews, thatplace must-at that momentbecome the center of the universe.1

Elie Wiesel's comment cuts to the heart of the conflict between the
humanitarian impulse, which compels nations to open their borders,
and the concept of state sovereignty, which depends for its existence
upon the control of borders. When the United States acts as a nation

to assist refugees, this conflict is inevitable. Wiesel's articulation of
humanitarian concern also defines parameters for that concern: persecution because of "race, religion, or political views." People who are
persecuted for these reasons are not the only possible subjects of

humanitarian interest. However, this particularized concept is significant because it is embraced by the definition of -"refugee" under
United States law.2

Assuming even this limited form of humanitarian concern, the
United States refugee program is lopsided. In practice, political considerations take priority over humanitarian concerns. Although many
people qualify as "refugees" under the Refugee Act's definition, further distinctions are necessary in order to have a manageable number
that can be resettled in the United States.' Political considerations
1. Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech by Elie Wiesel in Oslo, Norway, quoted on the cover
of U.S. COMmrrrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, 1986 IN REVIEW (1987).
2. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
3. One Congressman estimates that at least 15 million people in the world, most of whom are
concentrated in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Liberia, Southeast Asia, southern Africa, and
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dominate refugee policy at three levels: (1) defining "refugee";
(2) determining who fits the definition; and (3) choosing for resettlement in the United States a few among those who fit the definition.
The conflict between the humanitarian and political goals of the
Refugee Act of 1980 has resulted in a discriminatory refugee policy in
which political interests define and supersede humanitarian concerns.
United States refugee policy should ensure that special interests and
foreign policy concerns do not swallow up humanitarian concern for
the plight of refugees. This Comment proposes changes in the refugee
selection process to achieve a more desirable balance.
I.

THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 (the Act) was the first fundamental reform
of the laws on admission and resettlement of refugees since 1952.'
Comparing refugee policy before and after the Act indicates the major
issues the new legislation addressed, the areas of conflict, and the
nature of the compromises made among competing interests. The
Act's concept of "humanitarian concern" and the increasing role of
special interest pressure groups in influencing policy formulation are
of particular interest.
A.

Refugee Policy Before the Act

The Act was a response to the inadequate provision for refugees in
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).5 Under the old INA refugee provision, foreign policy explicitly motivated refugee policy: only
those who could establish that they had "fled" persecution in a Communist country or a country in the general area of the Middle East
qualified as refugees. 6 An ad hoc parole authority vested in the Attorney General supplemented the normal refugee admissions process.7
Central America, fit the Act's definition of refugee. 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 187 (1990). But
see infra note 58 and accompanying text (most refugees admitted to the United States are from
Communist countries or other political adversaries of the United States).
4. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 141, 142 (1981).
5. INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976) (repealed by the Refugee Act of 1980).
6. INA Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913, (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
7. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976) (amended by the Refugee Act of 1980).
"Parole" is a mechanism that allows the Attorney General to extend temporary, discretionary
safe haven to otherwise inadmissable aliens. Because parole does not constitute an "entry" into
the United States, the parolee can be excluded from the United States if parole status is
terminated or denied. Unlike deportable illegal aliens, excludable aliens have no constitutional
rights under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and must accept whatever process
Congress provides. See Shaugnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).

Overseas Refugee Program
Congress originally intended the parole mechanism to ameliorate
hardship in isolated cases, such as medical emergencies.' Parole also
provided a means whereby persons unable to fit the narrow refugee
definition could nevertheless be admitted temporarily. In practice,
however, parole was used to admit large groups rather than just individuals.9 As parole became the major vehicle for refugee admissions,
it became increasingly controversial, reinforcing the sense that an
orderly admissions process was needed. 10
B.

Policy Changes in the Overseas Refugee Program

Under the Act,"' Congress and the executive branch cooperated to
produce two major changes in overseas refugee policy: a new refugee
definition to reflect a changed admissions policy,12 and an admissions
system that would allow both flexibility and usable standards through
systematic consultations between Congress and the executive
branch.13
1.

The Definition of "Refugee"

To qualify for admission as a refugee to the United States, an-applicant must first meet the minimum statutory definition of "refugee."
Aliens desire refugee status not only for safe haven, but because the
status is highly privileged. The United States almost guarantees qualifying refugees permanent resident status one year after admission, 4
5
and assures them various types of resettlement assistance.'
The new refugee definition requires that a refugee have a "wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
8. S.REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., IstSess. 17, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3328, 3335.
9. See Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Pastand Future, TRANSNAT'L. LEGAL PROBS.OF
REFUGEES, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L L. STUD. 91, 93.

10. See Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisiv A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of
1980, 19 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 9, 30-33 (1981) (Congress perceived that parole admissions did not
permit formulation of any coherent refugee program, insulated the President from
accountability, and confused other nations, reducing their motivation to share in refugee relief).
11. The Act really comprises two refugee programs. Asylum concerns aliens who either enter
the United States as non-immigrants or illegally, or present themselves at the border, and seek to
remain as asylees and avoid deportation. The overseas refugee program concerns aliens still in a
foreign country or on the high seas who seek admission to the United States in the status of
refugees. This Comment focuses only on the overseas refugee program.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
13. Id.§ 1157(e) (1988).
14. Id § 1159(a) (1988).
15. Id. § 1522(a)-(e) (1988).
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 16 This
definition on its face is ideologically and geographically neutral. 7
Refugee status under this standard is determined on the basis of a persecution claim."8 By rejecting the old geopolitical refugee definition in
favor of this new definition, Congress brought the United States into
conformity with its obligations under the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol). 19 Congress also
intended the definition to reflect a humanitarian concern for the plight
of refugees, 20 rather than a narrow concern with foreign policy
interests.21
2.

The Consultation Process

In creating a new refugee policy, Congress and the executive branch
needed a system that would enable each branch to have some control
over the admissions process.22 The executive branch wanted flexibility
to conduct foreign policy, while Congress wanted to regain control
over refugee policy and numerical limits.23 The consultation process
resulted.2 4
The Act defines "appropriate consultation" as in-person discussions
between designated Cabinet-level representatives of the President and
committee members from both houses of Congress. 25 The discussions
16. Id. § 1101(a)(42). The Act's definition of refugee derives from the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signatureJan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (acceded to by the United States on Nov. 1, 1968).
17. See Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, in 6 IN
DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 201, 202 (1983).
18. The concept is one of individualized persecution as opposed to general persecution or
hardship. There is no provision for persons fleeing on account of economic distress; however, the
distinction between economic and political motivation is not always clear. See, e.g., Haitian
Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (viewing the poverty of Haiti as a
"function of the political system" and the Haitian migrants' economic situation as a "political
condition" that qualified them as refugees under the Act), overruled, Jean v. Nelson 727 F.2d 957
(11th Cir. 1984), aff'd. 472 U.S. 876 (1985).
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing old definition).
20. See Anker & Posner, supra note 10, at 46 (parts of the hearing record lauded the new
refugee definition as "a more universal standard based on uprootedness rather than ideology").
21. See Anker, The Development of U.S. Refugee Legislation, in 6 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN
159, 160 (1984).
22. Although Congress traditionally took the lead in overall immigration policy, Congress
tolerated executive authority over refugee affairs until the Refugee Act of 1980. See Mitchell,
Immigrants,Refugees and U.S. Hemispheric Relations, in 6 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 225, 227
(1984).

23. Anker & Posner, supra note 10, at 28, 34.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1988).
25. Id.
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establish whether proposed refugee admissions are justified by
"humanitarian concerns" or are "otherwise in the national interest."2 6
In addition, an "emergency provision" allows for additional admissions that are unforeseen at the time of the annual consultation.2"
There were two schools of thought in Congress regarding numerical
limits. Some members urged that any new admissions policy include a
clear numerical ceiling.28 Other members expressed concern that
arguments for a ceiling were a pretext to exclude refugees on selfish,
nativistic grounds,2 9 but acknowledged the need for limits in order to
garner popular and political support for the Act's passage.30 The
members compromised by setting an annual ceiling for the first three
years.3 1 Assuming the consultation process would replace ad hoe
parole admissions, the House also adopted an amendment to ensure
32
that the parole power would not be used to admit groups of refugees.

However, Congress did not repeal the Attorney General's parole
authority, through which the Administration continues to admit large
groups of refugees.3 3
The domestic policy considerations that motivated proposals for

numerical limits rcontinue to be significant. For most of the 1980's,
immigration policy in general has been marked by an increasing

emphasis on stemming illegal entry. 34 Additional domestic political
pressure against new entrants has come as a reaction to the various
waves of asylum and refuge seekers,3 5 the public perception of "bor26. Ia Specific information must be provided during consultation, including a description of
the refugee situation and an analysis of conditions in the countries of origin. See infra note 52
and accompanying text (the State Department compiles and presents this information).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1988). Congress enacted "emergency provisions" to provide the
executive branch with the flexibility to respond to unforeseen refugee crises once provided by the
parole authority, while retaining greater congressional control. Anker, supra note 21, at 34-35.
28. See Martin, supra note 9, at 100.
29. See, ag., Kennedy, supra note 4, at 144 (characterizing Congressman Eilberg's numerical
approach to refugee policy as "conservative and restrictionist").
30. See Anker, supra note 21, at 24.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (1988). The annual ceiling was 50,000 "normal-flow" admissions
above which admissions had to be deemed an "unforeseen emergency." Congress "sunsetted"
the ceiling after 1982 because of concern that it would become a floor rather than a ceiling. See
Martin, supra note 9, at 118-19.
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988) (limiting parole to individual refugees when required by
"compelling reasons in the public interest").
33. See infra note 69.
34. For example, the Immigration Reform and Control Act provides employer sanctions for
hiring illegal aliens. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988)).
35. See, e.g., Klein, Mass Asylum, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 19, 19-21 (1983)
(Americans felt violated by the Mariel boatlift from Cuba in 1980 and the Haitian asylum
"phenomenon").
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ders out of control,, 3 6 and the trend to shift the costs of resettlement
from the federal government to the states. 37 At the same time, con38
gressional demands for much greater admissions of particular groups
have resulted in an overall increase in refugee admissions since 1986.39
C.

"Of Special HumanitarianConcern"

1.

The Legislative History

After a person has met the threshold definition of refugee, a second
requirement for resettlement is that he or she come from one of the
regions and countries of "special humanitarian concern" to the United
States as designated by the annual consultation process.' During the
legislative hearings on the proposed Act, both branches expressed a
desire for a humanitarian approach to refugee admissions.4 1 However,
there was no commonly agreed upon definition for humanitarian, and
Congress refused to supply one.4 2 Nevertheless, even without a statutory definition, Congress insisted that the concept of humanitarian
concern be an essential element of the new refugee policy.4 3
Congress's humanitarian intent is implicit in the choice of the
"humanitarian concern" language to describe the standard for determining admissions allocations. The Administration originally proposed the standard "of special concern to the United States."'
However, some members of Congress felt that the Administration's
proposed standard permitted unwarranted executive discretion to
apply politically motivated selection criteria.45 Because the "special
concern" formulation was based on "cultural or historic ties" to the
United States,4 6 Congress believed the proposed standard signalled a
return to the discredited ideological restrictions and national origins
system.47 As a result, Congress insisted on the "special humanitarian
36. Senator Simpson has referred to the "compassion fatigue" of the American people.
Simpson, A Difficult Balance, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 120, 124 (1983).
37. See 10 REFUGEE REP., June 16, 1989, at 2-4.
38. See, e.g., 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 398-99 (1989) (some members of Congress
proposed legislation to double the number of Soviet admissions).
39. 10 REFUGEE REP., Dec. 29, 1989, at 8.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
41. Anker & Posner, supra note 10, at 37-38 (executive branch), 47, 55 (Congress).
42. House Report on the Refugee Act of 1979, H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1979) (to further define the phrase "humanitarian concern" would unnecessarily restrict future
policy decisions).
43. See generally, Anker & Posner, supra note 10 at 45-50.
44. Id. at 47-48.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id.
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concern" language,4" hoping to ensure that "the plight of the refugees
themselves, as opposed to national origins or political considerations
should be paramount in determining which refugees are to be admitted
to the United States."'4 9

Amnesty International and State Department testimony illustrate
the sometimes conflicting conceptions of "humanitarian concern" in
the legislative history. Amnesty witnesses stressed the pattern of
human rights violations in the country of origin and the plight of the
refugees,5 0 while the State Department focused on the "extent of our
5 1i
concern and interest in particular refugee groups.
The State Department's interpretation of "humanitarian concern" is
crucial to the consultation process for two reasons. First, the State
Department presents Congress with the only official analysis of refugee conditions considered during the consultation process,52 so its portrayal of humanitarian need is influential.
Second, the State Department and the INS use internal guidelines as
the last selection criteria for refugees who already meet both the refugee definition and are in one of the countries of "special humanitarian
concern to the United States." 53 The guidelines are supposed to
ensure that admissions conform to refugee policy. Because they are
internal, however, and not published in the Federal Register,5" an
essential part of the admissions process is subject to unbridled administrative discretion. At present, refugees in immediate danger of loss
of life, former political prisoners, and dissidents are categorized as the
first priority. 55 However, the provision is extremely narrow and is
applied in exceptional individual cases only: almost all refugees
admitted into the United States fall into the other categories, based
primarily on family ties and previous political ties to the United
States. 6
48. Id. at 60.
49. H.R. REP. No. 608, supra note 42, at 13.
50. Anker & Posner, supra note 10, at 55.
51. Id at 37.
52. Anker, supra note 21, at 164. The State Department's Refugee Coordinator's Office
prepares the Refugee Admission and Allocation Reports and Country Reports on the World
Refugee Situation (retitled after 1985 as World Refugee Report).

53. See OFFICE

OF THE COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, PROPOSED REFUGEE

ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR FIScAL YEAR 1989, at 18-19.
54. See Anker, supra note 21, at 163 & n.20.
55. See supra note 53, at 18. The guidelines do not define "dissidents" or "political
prisoners."
56. See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, PROPOSED REFUGEE

ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985, at 38; see also infra notes 100-101 and
accompanying text (suggested changes in priority guidelines).
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Consultation and "HumanitarianConcern"

In the first few years of the consultation process, Congress largely
confined its input to asking for a decrease in numbers, rather than
questioning the designation of groups as "of special humanitarian concern."57 Congress thereby left geographical allocations to the Administration. As a result, since 1980, admissions have been
overwhelmingly from communist countries. 8 The only significant
admissions from a noncommunist country have been from Iran, 9 also
viewed as a foreign policy adversary by the U.S. government.' In
1990 this trend continues, with almost all of the proposed admissions
in fiscal year (FY) 1990 from communist or communist-dominated
countries.6 1
D. Special Interest Groups: A New Development
1.

HumanitarianParole

Recently, legislators have pushed the Administration for increased
admissions of specific religious and ethnic groups,6 2 in particular
Soviet Jews and Evangelicals, 6a Czechs, and Poles.' In part, ethnic
constituencies motivated these requests.6 5 In 1988 and 1989, respectively, the INS dropped its longstanding but unofficial presumptions of
67
66
eligibility for refugee status for all Soviet and certain Vietnamese
applicants. The INS shifted to case-by-case determinations of a "wellfounded fear of persecution," which is the statutory requirement for
refugee admissions under the Act. 68 The change in INS policy, however, does not mean that those groups denied refugee status cannot
57. See Anker, supra note 21, at 166.
58. 10 REFUGEE REP., Dec. 29, 1989, at 13-14. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying

text (congressional deference permits foreign policy concerns to exclusively dominate refugee
policy
59.
60.
61.

due to East-West tensions).
Id.
Helton, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, 1988 IN REVIEW, 25, 26 (1989).
See Presidential Determination No. 90-2, 54 Fed. Reg. 202, 43,035 (1989) (proposed FY

1990 admissions allocations).
62. In 1988, Congress originally agreed to admit 18,000 Soviets as refugees in FY 1989, and
then raised the ceiling to 25,000 by shifting numbers from other regions. In 1989, lawmakers
requested emergency consultations to raise the ceiling from 25,000 to 50,000. 66 INTERPRETER

RELEASES 397-98 (1989).
63.

10 REFUGEE REP., July 28, 1989, at 1-3.

64. 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1264 (1989) (testimony of Reps. Kaptur and Lipinski).
65. See 10 REFUGEE REP., Sept. 22, 1989, at 7.
66. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1286 (1988); 10 REFUGEE REP., Mar. 17, 1989, at 6-7.
67. 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 715 (1989). This presumption applied only to Vietnamese in
the Orderly Departure Program.
68. 10 REFUGEE REP., Apr. 28, 1989, at 1.
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enter the United States. The Administration still offers the alternative
of "public interest parole"6 9 to Soviets7° or certain Vietnamese71 who
formerly were presumed eligible but no longer meet the definition of
refugee because they cannot demonstrate persecution, or a wellfounded fear of persecution.
2. Reduced Admission Standardfor Certain Groups
United States representatives of Soviet ethnic and religious groups
protested the loss of presumptive eligibility and were unsatisfied with
parole status,7 2 which lacks the resettlement assistance and other privileges of refugee status.73 As a result of their efforts, President Bush
signed the Lautenberg Amendment,74 which allows certain nationals
of the Soviet Union and certain Indochinese to be admitted more easily to the United States in refugee status, on November 21, 1989.11
Eligible aliens 76 need only assert a fear of persecution and show a
"credible basis for concern about the possibility of such
'77
persecution.
II. HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS IN REFUGEE POLICY:
THE NEED FOR REFORM
United States refugee policy is the product of compromise among
four main influences: humanitarian concerns, foreign policy, special
interest group pressure, and domestic concerns. Each influence represents a different goal for the Act. Throughout the past decade these
69. 67 INrERPRETER RELEASES 85 (1990) (the Administration presently views the parole
power as a way of admitting up to 2,000 aliens each month who do not fit the refugee definition).
70. 10 REFUGEE RE'., Apr. 28, 1989, at 2.
71. 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 398 (1989).
72. 10 REFUGEE REP., Apr. 28, 1989, at 4-5 (United States representatives for Soviet Jews
and Pentacostals); see also, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 715-16 (1989) (reasons for presumptive
eligibility for Vietnamese).
73. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing privileges of refugee status).
74. See 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 85 (1990).
75. See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1318 (1989). The fact that the President reserves the
function to specify "special circumstances" for purposes of qualifying persons as refugees is a
major loophole in the Act's refugee definition. Exec. Order No. 12,208, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,789
(1980).
76. For those who are not eligible for "special category" refugee status, the Administration
has proposed "special interest immigrant" legislation to allow 30,000 aliens a year to be admitted
for foreign policy reasons. The legislation would also retroactively benefit persons who entered
the United States as parolees. See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 398-99 (1989).
77. See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1318 (1989). Soviet Jews, Evangelical Christians and
members of other religious groups will be able to meet the new standard for obtaining refugee
status under the INS implementing guidelines. 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 86 (1990).
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influences have varied in strength and dominance. To the extent that
other interests override humanitarian goals, the Act is a failure.
The following discussion uses this paradigm of multiple goals as a
premise. It first addresses why humanitarian concern for the plight of
refugees should be central to refugee policy. Second, the discussion
critiques the roles of foreign policy, special interest groups, and
domestic concerns in refugee policy under the Act, and suggests specific changes to achieve a more desirable balance with humanitarian
concern as the policy priority.
A.

HumanitarianConcern

1.

The Essential Role of HumanitarianConcern

Foreign policy, special interests, and domestic concerns have overwhelmed humanitarian concerns under the Act because Congress
lacks a strong vested interest in ensuring the humanitarian approach.
Of the various concerns that the Act addresses, humanitarianism has
the weakest "clientele." Yet humanitarian concerns should be the
highest priority in refugee policy because they alone justify a special
refugee category of immigrant. The other three interests are better
served by other means. For example, while refugee admissions implicitly discredit adversary governments as persecutors, many other means
are available to disparage adversary governments. Similarly, although
special interest groups seek funding to help those they represent, the
refugee program is not the only vehicle through which funds can be
provided."8 In contrast, for the dispossessed refugee without a constituency in a third country, there is no alternative to compassionate refuge extended by the United States or some other government.
A second reason that humanitarian concern should be the highest
priority in refugee policy involves the difficult question of moral obligation. Elie Wiesel's statement that "national borders and sensitivities
should become irrelevant when human lives are endangered," 79 represents the ideal of a purely altruistic moral position. Although pure
altruism is untenable in the context of limited resources, Wiesel's ideal
represents a fundamental value incorporated into the Refugee Act
when Congress adopted the United Nations definition of "refugee." 8
At the other end of the spectrum from pure altruism is the "compas78. See infra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing proposed special immigrant
legislation).
79. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (Congress wanted the definition to reflect a
humanitarian concern for the plight of the refugee).
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sion fatigue" notion put forward by Senator Simpson.8 ' His notion
assumes that the primary obligation of the Refugee Act is to serve a
narrowly conceived "national interest" and that compassion must be
bridled, otherwise the American people will eventually become unwilling to extend compassionate refuge.8 2
Between the Wiesel position that the sole beneficiaries of refugee
policy should be the refugees, and the Simpson position that the beneficiaries should be the American people, lies a middle ground. This
middle position holds that a narrowly conceived national interest is
inconsistent with the moral and practical realities of the superpower
status of the United States. Moreover, even assuming the Simpson
position, compassion for refugees and concern for the national interest
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, including humanitarian "compassion" as a separate criterion on which to allocate refugee admissions
serves the national interest because it helps preserve United States
credibility in politically unstable, refugee producing regions.8 3
2. An InitialStep to SafeguardHumanitarianConcerns
To ensure the vitality of humanitarian concerns in refugee policy,
Congress should take the following first step. Refugees in immediate
danger of loss of life and for whom no other alternative to resettlement
in the United States exists, victims of torture, and political prisoners
should be the first priority for refugee admissions. Congress should
amend the definition of "appropriate consultation"8 4 to incorporate
this priority into the consultation process. For example, the statutory
definition of "appropriate consultation" now requires that executive
branch representatives provide congressional committee members
with "a description of the refugee situation."8 " Congress should
amend this provision to read: "a description of the refugee situation,
including specific information on refugees in immediate danger of loss
of life, victims of torture and political prisoners." This proposed
amendment has two advantages: it does not explicitly define "humanitarian concern," which Congress has so adamantly resisted, and it
makes the plight of the most needy difficult to ignore because the
81.
82.
83.
come

See Simpson, supra note 36, at 120-124.
Id
The Bush Administration perceives that the threat of armed conffict is more likely to
from the Third World than from the Soviet Union. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 21,

1990, at A2, col. 6. See also supra note 3 (most refugees are concentrated in regions of the Third
World).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1988).
85. Id
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information must be presented and considered during every consultation. Thus, Congress will have to take responsibility openly for choosing to ignore their plight. The main disadvantage of the proposed
amendment is that it is very mild. But a more overt statement of
humanitarian concern, such as statutorily defining it as concern primarily for the plight of refugees, probably would encounter the same
resistance it encountered when the Act was first considered.86
B. Foreign Policy
1.

Refugee Law as a Tool of Foreign Policy

Consecutive administrations have used refugee policy primarily as a
tool to discredit foreign policy adversaries.8 7 For the most part, this
tactic has been directed at Communist governments. 88 The apparent
end of the Cold War does not necessarily mean the Administration
will end the practice. However, the practice should end for three reasons. First, it violates legislative intent that refugee status be based
upon a persecution claim rather than ideology.89 Second, it can have
unintended negative effects, as with the 1980 Mariel boatlift from
Cuba, which Castro exploited to rid Cuba of undesirables.9 ° Third, it
fails to account for the interdependence of foreign policy and refugee
policy. Instead of considering only how refugee policy serves shortterm foreign policy goals, the Administration also should consider
how foreign policy decisions can create refugee flows. 91 The domestic
implications of such flows include illegal immigration, resettlement
92
costs, and political backlash against immigration and refugees.
International implications include instability in regions that will
86. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
87. See Teitelbaum, Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 429, 439 (1984) (critics charge the administration is unwilling to recognize that
allies produce refugees-for example, El Salvador).
88. See Teitelbaum, InternationalMigration and Foreign Policy, in 6 IN DEFENSE OF THE

ALIEN 219, 220 (1984) (Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam have figured most prominently).
89. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (refugee definition reflects a humanitarian
concern for the plight of refugees). But see Zolberg, infra note 96 and accompanying text
(executive has discretion to define "persecution").
90. See Teitelbaum, supra note 88, at 221.
91. This includes both "pull" factors such as an official announcement that certain nationals
will not be returned to their country, and "push" factors such as U.S. policy in El Salvador
which may be prolonging a civil war that generates refugee flows. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note
22, at 228.

92. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 87, at 433 (foreign-policy makers tend to see refugee
consequences as a problem for "others" because once admitted they are usually the responsibility
of local rather than national government).
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become long-term foreign policy problems for the United States.9 3
Thus, foreign policy decision-makers should address the interrelationship between refugee policy and foreign policy with long-term effects
in mind.
2. InteractionBetween Foreign Policy and HumanitarianConcerns
Under the Act
Foreign policy is an inherent part of the Refugee Act for two reasons. First, congressional deference to the executive branch on foreign
policy ensures that foreign policy considerations are as influential as
the executive branch sees fit. For example, the Act's requirement that
consultation include analysis of the impact of refugee resettlement on
the foreign policy interests of the United States is evidence that Congress recognized the foreign policy imperative.9 4 The Act also provides that consultation include discussion of why "admission of
refugees is justified by humanitarian concerns ...or is otherwise in the
national interest."9 5 This language places other undefined "national
interests" on an equal par with the humanitarian concerns. In fact,
because the section reads "or otherwise in the national interest," the
Act permits admission of refugees on a purely political basis 6 Such
congressional deference to executive branch control over foreign policy arguably was justified in 1980 because of East-West tensions, even
at the cost of humanitarian concerns. However, the recent changes in
East-West relations provide an opportunity to de-emphasize foreign
policy in refugee policy.
The second reason foreign policy is an inherent part of refugee policy is that even if foreign policy considerations were de-emphasized
because of present international conditions, foreign policy decisionmakers would probably be reluctant to accept any reduction in their
93. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 156 (massive refugee movements are a threat to peace and

international stability).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e)(6) (1988). Also, Congress's initial deferral to the executive on
geographical allocations may be interpreted as deference to the primacy of foreign policy
concerns in the context of heightened East-West tensions over other Congressional concerns
regarding refugee policy. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.

95. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1988).
96. Id. (emphasis added). The requirement of an analysis of the foreign policy impact applies
equally to emergency group admissions. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)(2) (1988). This indicates that
Congress intended that even emergency admissions should not conform completely to a
nonpolitical standard. See also Zolberg, InternationalMigrationand Foreign Policy: When Does
a Marginal Issue Become Substantive?, in 6 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 209, 217-18 (1984)
(Congress' aquiescence to executive branch dominance is indicated in the 1980 Act, which
permits executive discretion in ascertaining when "persecution" has occurred: thus the tendency
to restrict refugee status to "victims of communism").
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ability to influence refugee policy. 97 Due to a natural reluctance to
relinquish power or influence once gained, policy makers have a vested
interest in maintaining a certain degree of relevance for foreign policy
considerations. Moreover, executive agencies have gained an
expanded role by their ability to respond more quickly than Congress
to formulate policy in politically sensitive refugee "crises", such as the
Mariel boatlift and the Haitian influx.98 Thus, the question is not how
to eliminate foreign policy influence, but how to make decision-makers
more responsive to humanitarian concerns.
3. Suggestionsfor SafeguardingHumanitarian Concernsfrom
Foreign Policy
Procedural changes in the selection process are necessary to safeguard humanitarian concerns from foreign policy. First, both humanitarian goals and foreign policy goals could be accommodated if,
within the consultation process, policy-makers had to consider the
impact of foreign policy decisions on refugee flows. This proposal simply expands the current requirement that decision-makers assess the
impact of refugee policy on foreign policy goals, to include an assessment of the impact of foreign policy decisions on refugee policy.99 If
the executive branch considers such information too sensitive to be
made public, there are at least two options: (1) create a liaison between
the National Security Council and the congressional committees on
refugee policy; or (2) form a special committee composed of executive
agency experts on foreign policy and national security issues and
members of Congress who sit on refugee policy committees. These
reforms would integrate the decision making bodies in a way that
would allow careful consideration of refugee consequences.
Second, the State Department's "World Wide Priorities" guidelines
should be amended to conform with the proposed change in the
"humanitarian concern" priority in the consultation process and
should be published in the Federal Register. 1" The guidelines' first
97. See Zolberg, supra note 96, at 217 ("admission of refugees is so intimately tied in with the
conduct of foreign policy that no president would be willing to relinquish... discretion in this
sphere").
98. See Mitchell, supra note 22, at 227-28.
99. The State Department's Country Report (retitled World Refugee Report) sometimes
includes an analysis of the causes of outflows from particular countries, but does not consider
U.S. foreign policy decisions as a cause. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REP. ON THE WORLD REFUGEE SITUATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 84-85 (1984) (El

Salvador).
100. In spite of legislative intent to the contrary, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text, the State Department and INS internal guidelines make the final cut among otherwise
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category for refugees in immediate danger of loss of life, and former
political prisoners and dissidents should not be limited to exceptional
cases. 10 1 Instead, the guidelines should be changed to state that this
category will be broadly construed and applied to groups where
appropriate.
Third, the State Department should not be the only source of information on international human rights and world refugee conditions
submitted to Congress as part of the consultation process. Such information should come from independent agencies with expertise in those
areas, such as Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, voluntary agencies that work in refugee camps, the Watch
Committees, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Conversely, the State Department reports should be considered
in the context of their United States foreign policy perspective.
C. Accommodating Special Interest Groups
In response to the ethnic and religious constituencies of certain
members, Congress demands blatant national origins discrimination in
refugee admissions allocations.1" 2 Because those persons denied refugee status do not have standing to obtain judicial review,' any challenge to the allocation of refugee admissions will not, as a general rule,
come from the refugees themselves. Only those refugees who have the
support of a political constituency in the United States can influence
allocations and admissions decisions." °
The Lautenberg Amendment, 05 establishing a presumption of eligibility for certain groups, is a return to national origins discrimination.
Furthermore, this Amendment sets the precedent that admissions
numbers and resettlement assistance funds will go to those with the
strongest political constituency in the United States, rather than to
those most in danger of persecution. The Amendment is also a bad
qualified refugees on the basis of family, cultural and historic ties to the United States. See
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
ALLOCATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985, at 35-38 (1984).

101. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing current guidelines).
102. 10 REFUGEE REP., July 28, 1989, at 3-4 (the Lautenberg Amendment directs the
Attorney General to admit Soviet nationals who are Jewish, Evangelical Christian, Ukrainian
Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox, and certain Vietnamese).
103. See Shaugnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (excludable aliens
have no due process rights).
104. In criticizing the impact of special interest groups on refugee policy, the purpose is not to
single out those groups as undeserving of refuge, particularly as their treatment is unpredictable.
See, eg., 10 REFUGEE REP., Mar. 17, 1989, at 8. Rather, the purpose is to show that allowing
lobbyists to dominate refugee policy results in the de-emphasis of humanitarian concerns.
105. See INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 74, at 85.
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precedent because it shifts the focus of refugee policy from the plight
of refugees and how to improve their condition, to who can get the
financial and permanent resident benefits associated with refugee status. 10 6 In effect it allows, for example, Eastern European and Soviet
professionals in relatively comfortable circumstances to be admitted as
refugees, while other groups are forced to cope with life-threatening
situations.
Nationality-specific language should not be appended to the Act, as
in the Lautenberg Amendment. Instead, Congress should accommodate special interest groups through an admissions category funded by
private groups.' 017 The ability of some groups to obtain a special interest admissions category and resettlement funds through lobbying
efforts could be characterized as preferential and unfair.108 However,
at the very least, the refugee program would not be compromised.
Refugee admissions would be reserved for those who fit the Act's definition and for whom there is no other resettlement alternative.0 9
Although group-specific amendments to the Act could also serve those
who are not represented by political constituencies, 11 0 legislating refugee status for specific groups defeats the purpose of having a comprehensive refugee definition.1 1
D. Addressing Domestic Concerns
Foreign policy and special interest group exploitation of the refugee
program has exacerbated an already existing domestic resistance to
newcomers. Such resistance hurts most those refugees who are of
humanitarian concern but have no political or family ties. Inevitably,
they will be the first ones denied resettlement to appease the desire for
106. Soviet emigres in Rome rejected the offer of parole because they understood that it was
inferior to refugee status and benefits. Historically, however, groups admitted under parole have
been permitted to adjust to permanent resident status through legislative initiatives, and have
been given work permits. 10 REFUGEE REP., Mar. 17, 1989, at 7.
107. See, e.g., 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 701, 716 (1989) (discussing Representative Lamar

Smith's proposed special immigrant legislation supported by the Administration; its stated
purpose is to accommodate more immigrants for foreign policy reasons, not to specifically end
the practice of admitting them as refugees when they do not fit the definition).
108. Although it may be possible to work out a pragmatic and more equitable way to
accommodate these groups, to do so would involve complex practical and policy issues beyond
the scope of this Comment.
109. 10 REFUGEE REP., Sept. 22, 1989, at 6 (statement of Senator Simpson that Soviet Jews
are the only group of refugees that has a choice of country of first asylum).
110. For example, Jews and Bahais in Iran, Iraqi Kurds, Cambodian civilians under Khmer
Rouge control, black South Africans not affiliated with liberation movements, victims of torture,
and political prisoners throughout the world have been suggested as under-represented but
deserving of refugee status. See 10 REFUGEE REP., Apr. 28, 1989, at 4.
111. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (discussing refugee definition).
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numerical limits, while those with more influence continue to be
admitted. In the legislative process, members of Congress advocating
numerical limits were reconciled to the Act by the prospect of an
orderly, systematic program for admissions of refugees that would
take the place of ad hoc parole admissions. However, in response to
foreign policy and special interest group influence, Congress has tolerated executive branch use of group parole in spite of original inten12
tions to the contrary.'
This use of parole is not only significant as a failure to fulfill the
Act's mandate to create an orderly, systematic program for the admission of refugees, but may also be a cause of domestic reaction against
the refugee program. Although this reaction has been called "compas'
sion fatigue,"113
the term is a misnomer. The "fatigue" may be more
aptly attributable not to the dominance of humanitarian concerns, but
to the continued abuse of the parole power, as well as the increasing
shift of refugee resettlement costs to state and local communities. 4 A
decline in public support for the refugee program may also be a consequence of "client politics." A few lobbying groups gain the benefit of
refugee admissions and allocations, while the costs are widely spread.
Calling the public reaction to these political failures "compassion
fatigue" frustrates humanitarian goals even further, and diverts attention from the real sources of the problem. As a result, there is comparatively little effective advocacy for humanitarian concerns based on
the plight of refugees.
Repeal of the parole power is not a workable solution to the problem because neither Congress nor the executive branch has demonstrated a willingness to lose the flexibility the parole power
provides. 115 Because of the impact of political influence on parole
admissions, the proposed special interest immigration category" 16
would address the problem of the expansive use of parole by channeling the special interest admissions into a more politically accountable
immigration category. In addition, the federal government should
112. 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 717 (1989). Representative Bruce A. Morrison, Chair of
the House Immigration Subcommittee, requested the INS to submit a detailed analysis of its uses
of parole. He strongly protested the current parole program as not being in accordance with the
INA § 212(d)(5) requirement of parole as "temporary"; as being unfair to many immigrants in
other parts of the world who are not offered parole; and as being without any standards. Id.
113. See Simpson, supra note 36, at 124.
114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing shifting burden of resettlement
costs).

115. See., eg., 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 716 (1989) (parole continues to serve as a stopgap source of admissions).
116. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing a special immigration category).
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adequately fund the costs of refugee resettlement and stop the trend of
shifting the burden to the states.
III.

CONCLUSION

Refugee policy under the Refugee Act of 1980 cannot be legitimate
unless it is based primarily upon a compassionate humanitarian concern for the plight of refugees. Yet three other influences-foreign
policy, special interest groups, and domestic concerns-undermine the
capacity of humanitarian concerns to influence refugee policy. The
apparent end of the Cold War justifies a de-emphasis of foreign policy
and presents an opportunity to safeguard humanitarian concerns by
reforming allocations and admissions policy through changes in the
consultation process. Special interest groups now pose the greatest
danger to the integrity of United States refugee policy, but it is possible to accommodate their goals outside of the refugee program. In the
future, if not addressed, domestic intolerance may threaten refugee
admissions. To preserve the goals of the 1980 Refugee Act reforms
must effectively prevent these three influences from corrupting refugee
policy. To be effective, however, any change must strike a balance
between reform and accommodation of forces that would otherwise
thwart reform. Thus, the proposed changes are sensitive to the roots
of political resistance in the executive branch and Congress by recognizing their respective stakes in refugee policy while preventing them
from superseding humanitarian concerns.
Tahl Tyson

